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1. Introduction
Buck-passing accounts (BPAs) hold that normative properties such as badness and 
rightness can be reduced to non-normative properties that constitute reasons for certain 
responses, such as performing a certain type of action or holding a certain attitude (e.g. 
favoring, promoting, blaming, desiring). For example, on such accounts, the badness 
of a certain object is reducible to its having certain (non-normative) properties that 
constitute reasons to have a negative attitude toward it (e.g. disfavor, dislike). Similarly, 
the rightness of an action of a certain type can be reduced to the obtaining of non-
normative properties that constitute sufficient reasons to perform it or to respond 
favorably to it (e.g. praise the agents who perform it).1 Such accounts are named 
“buck-passing” because they pass the normative buck from the properties themselves 
(goodness, badness, rightness, wrongness) to the more basic good-, bad-, right-, or 
wrong-making properties that constitute reasons for certain responses.
While BPAs are widely discussed in the literature, there have been surprisingly few 
attempts to apply buck-passing analyses to specific normative domains such as aes-
thetics and epistemology. In particular, there have been very few works which have 
tried to provide complete and detailed buck-passing analyses of epistemic values and 
norms. These analyses are, however, both interesting and important. On the one hand, 
they can bring to the surface the advantages and difficulties of extending the BPA to 
specific normative spheres, either providing further support for the approach or high-
lighting substantive difficulties. On the other hand, epistemic buck-passing analyses 
can be beneficial for normative epistemology, providing new perspectives on traditional 
1 Upholders of this type of view include Parfit 2011; Scanlon 1998; Skorupski 2010; Stratton-Lake and 
Hooker 2006. Many have endorsed the latter interpretation and provided buck-passing analyses of both 
evaluative and deontic properties (e.g. Skorupski  2010; Stratton-Lake  2000). Others endorsed BPAs of 
evaluative properties (e.g. Scanlon 1998) only, or of deontic properties only (Dancy 2004, 34). We don’t see 
any reason to restrict our attention to a subset of normative properties.
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epistemological problems, and possibly providing fresh approaches to such problems. 
This chapter aims at partially filling this gap.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2, we show how the BPA analyses 
various kinds of normative properties. In Section 3, we try to apply these analyses in 
the epistemic domain. This allows us to draw a number of conclusions that we sum-
marize in Section 4. It is important to emphasize that our goal in this chapter is 
restricted to the issue of whether and how a BPA can be extended to the epistemic 
domain. For this reason, we will not be concerned with specific arguments for or 
against endorsing this kind of account.2
2. General Buck-Passing
A BPA is supposed to capture not only thin normative properties—such as goodness, 
badness, rightness, and wrongness—but also thick normative properties—such as desir-
ability, kindness, and boringness—and perhaps even others such as what Skorupski 
calls “mixed” and “complex” properties. Accordingly, we first provide, in the current 
section, buck-passing analyses of some paradigmatic thin normative properties such 
as goodness and badness (evaluative), and rightness and wrongness (deontic). Then 
we present buck-passing analyses of thick normative properties and of mixed and 
 complex properties. Finally we show how a BPA captures the distinction between final 
and instrumental value.
Before proceeding further, two remarks are in order. First, we are aware that many 
buck-passers will disagree with some of the details of the forthcoming analyses, in 
particular as regard the relevant type of pro- or con-attitudes. Such details do not, 
however, matter for our purpose. The present discussion is merely exemplificative. 
It aims at providing a background for the analyses of epistemic normative properties 
that are presented in Section 3. Second, we recognize that, while it is uncontroversial 
that some properties—for instance, thin normative properties such as good and right 
and thick properties such as cruelty and desirability—are normative, other properties 
are not uncontentiously normative (an example is courage). The reader is free to restrict 
the field of normative properties as she thinks opportune.
Thin normative properties
Goodness
For an object X to be good is for X to have certain properties that constitute reasons 
to have a pro-attitude (e.g. favoring, desiring, liking) toward X.
Badness
For an object X to be bad is for X to have certain properties that constitute reasons to 
have a con-attitude (e.g. disfavoring, blaming, condemning) toward X.
2 See Olson 2013; Suikkanen 2009 for overviews of these arguments.
0004158663.INDD   47 7/25/2018   7:36:38 AM
Dictionary: NOSD
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 07/25/2018, SPi
48 Davide Fassio and Anne Meylan
Rightness
A certain type of act F is right iff there are some facts p which are (jointly) sufficient 
reasons to F.3
Wrongness
A certain type of act F is wrong iff there are no facts p which are (jointly) sufficient 
reasons to F.4
Let us briefly comment on two differences between the analyses of evaluative (goodness, 
badness) and deontic (rightness, wrongness) properties. First, for deontic properties, 
the object of assessment (what is right or wrong) can be identical with the response 
(attitude or action) supported or opposed by reasons. As you can see in the analyses 
above, the act that is right is also the one that there is reason to perform. In contrast, 
many take it to be an essential constraint on buck-passing analyses of value that the 
valuable object (what is good or bad) must be the intentional object of the response 
supported or opposed by reasons (see Stratton-Lake 2013, §1), not the response itself. 
For example, a good thing is one that there is reason to favor; a cruel act is one there is 
reason to condemn, and so on. Second, while evaluative properties can be analyzed in 
terms of reasons simpliciter (or pro tanto), deontic properties can only be analyzed 
in terms of sufficient reasons. Mere pro tanto reasons to desire X are sufficient to make 
X pro tanto good, but may be insufficient to reach the minimal threshold necessary to 
make X pro tanto right.
Goodness, badness, rightness, and wrongness can be characterized as thin properties 
in virtue of their carrying minimal or no descriptive content about the thing assessed. 
In contrast, thick properties carry descriptive information about the thing assessed. It 
is an open question how to determine which properties should count as thin or thick, 
and maybe there is no neat answer to this question. However, the list of normative 
properties usually classified as thick properties includes admirability, desirability, 
kindness, disgustingness, cruelty, fairness, generosity, and boringness.
How could a BPA be extended to thick normative properties? One main strategy 
consists in discriminating between distinct thick normative properties by identifying 
distinct, more specific kinds of appropriate responses. Particular appropriate (positive 
or negative) responses—i.e. particular ways of favoring or disfavoring a certain 
object—correspond to particular thick properties. For example, we can define the 
admirable as what there is reason to admire, the desirable as what there is reason to 
desire, the boring as what there is reason to feel bored of, and the disgusting as what 
3 The “iff ” in this formula and the formulas that follow should be read as an analysis of the property that 
is located on the left side of the bi-conditional in terms of what is located on its right side.
4 Some philosophers, such as Skorupski (2007, 2010, ch. 2), provide a similar analysis for certain nor-
mative uses of “should” and “ought.” An action (or attitude) that we should/ought to do (have) is one that 
there are decisive (or uniquely sufficient) reasons to do (have). See also Parfit 2011, 33.
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there is reason to feel disgusted by. The following is a schema for buck-passing analyses 
of thick properties that relies on this approach:
Thick normative property
For an X to have the thick normative property Y is for X to have certain properties 
P that constitute reasons to have a specific pro-/con-attitude A
Y
 toward X.
In this schema, A
Y
 denotes the specific response associated with the specific normative 
property Y. Here attitude A
Y
 is more specific than attitude A, where A characterizes a 
thin property relative to the relevant domain. For example, the attitude of admiration 
is a specific way of favoring. Favoring appears in the analysis of the thin property of 
goodness, while admiration specifies the thicker property of admirability, where 
admirability is a specific way of being good.
A problem with such an approach is that it is notoriously difficult to isolate the specific 
responses individuating each thick normative property.5 Consider, for example, 
cruelty. We can say that, for X to be cruel, is for X to have certain properties P that con-
stitute reasons to condemn X, but many other normative properties share with cruelty 
these same appropriate responses (e.g. ruthlessness and inhumanity). On an alterna-
tive approach, thick properties would not be specified by the appropriate kind of 
response, but by the specific set of non-normative properties that appear in the analysans.6 
This analysis is very similar to Skorupski’s analysis of what he calls “mixed properties.” 
A mixed normative property is one that reduces to the possession of a specific set of non-
normative properties that constitute reason to have a (non-specific) pro- (or con-)attitude 
(Skorupski 2007, 264).
From now on, we will accordingly make use of two distinct idioms. We will speak of 
“thick normative properties” in order to denote thick normative properties of the first 
kind (e.g. admirability, boringness), the ones that can conveniently be captured in terms 
of specific responses. In contrast, we shall speak of “mixed properties” in order to denote 
thick normative properties of the second kind (e.g. cruelness and kindness). The thick 
normative properties of the second kind are those that are captured in terms of the pos-
session, by the thing assessed, of specific properties and not in terms of specific responses.
The following is a general schema for buck-passing analyses of mixed normative 
properties:
Mixed properties
For X to have a mixed normative property Y is for X to have certain specific properties 
P
Y
 that constitute reasons to have a pro- (or con-)attitude toward X.
5 See Crisp 2005; Väyrynen 2006.
6 See Suikkanen  2009, 774–5. There are objections to this second approach as well. See Crisp  2005; 
Väyrynen 2006; and Suikkanen  2009 for a response. As a matter of fact, we are not obliged to choose 
between these two approaches. It might well be that properties such as admirability and boringness can be 
analyzed in the former, attitude-based way, while other properties such as cruelty and compassion can 
instead be accounted for in the latter way, and thus be classified as mixed properties.
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For example, we can classify a cruel act as one having certain specific properties, such 
as willfully causing gratuitous suffering to others, which constitute reasons to disfavor 
it. Similarly, a behavior is ruthless if it doesn’t show pity or compassion to others, which 
provide reasons to disfavor it. And an act is kind when it shows a friendly and consid-
erate nature and these properties constitute reasons to favor it. Other properties that 
seem to be amenable to the same type of analysis are, for example, the properties of 
being lazy, arrogant, unfriendly, careless, compassionate, magnanimous, reckless, 
nasty, mean, malicious, and brutal.
Finally, there might be other normative properties and entities that we may label 
“complex” in that they are partly constituted by normative properties and, partly, by 
non-normative properties. Consider, for instance, murder.7 A murder is an intentional 
killing done with malice. In virtue of being malicious, there is reason to blame and 
condemn this act. Thus, murder is a complex entity constituted in part by a non-
normative component—i.e. the intentional killing—and in part by a (thick or mixed) 
normative property—i.e. its being done maliciously.
We conclude this section by presenting the buck-passing way of capturing a further 
classical distinction, that between final value and instrumental value.
Final value
For an X to have final value is for X to have properties which constitute reasons 
to favor X for its own sake.
Instrumental value
For an X to have instrumental value is for X to have properties which constitute 
reasons to favor X for the sake of some distinct good that X might bring about (or for 
the sake of some distinct bad that X might prevent).
For example, the instrumental value of money is reducible to the fact that money has the 
property of allowing buying goods and this property constitutes reasons to favor money.
Note that the distinction between final and instrumental value is orthogonal to the 
distinctions between thin, thick, and mixed normative properties considered above. 
The reason why we introduce it will become clear in Section 3.5, in which we consider 
how a BPA is able to capture the epistemic value of cognitive states such as knowledge, 
true beliefs, justified beliefs, and understanding.
3. Epistemic Buck-Passing
The previous section presented analyses by means of which the BPA seems able to cap-
ture various kinds of normative properties (thin, thick, mixed, complex). In the current 
section, we rely on this previous presentation to suggest buck-passing analyses of the 
epistemic counterparts of these same kinds of properties. Our first objective is, of 
course, to consider whether and how the BPA can be extended to the specific domain 
7 See Skorupski 2007, 265.
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of epistemic normativity. But, as we shall see, our attempt to develop buck-passing 
analyses of epistemic normative properties also provides very interesting results 
regarding some important contemporary debates in epistemology.
Our method in this section is quite simple. For each category of normative proper-
ties previously considered, we try to find an epistemic equivalent, that is, one that 
should be susceptible to the same kind of analysis. In the previous section we isolated 




• complex normative properties and entities;
• final/instrumental values.8
Accordingly, we consider buck-passing analyses of thin epistemic properties in 
Section 3.1, of thick properties in Section 3.2, of mixed properties in Section 3.3, of 
complex properties in Section 3.4, and finally, in Section 3.5, we will say a few words 
about epistemic instrumental values in a buck-passing framework.
Before proceeding further, we should recognize a potential obstacle to our project. 
While there are epistemic properties whose normativity is pretty uncontroversial, the 
normativity of others has been highly disputed. Though this problem is not specific to 
epistemology, it seems potentially more serious in this domain because philosophers 
have contested the normativity of virtually every epistemic property. Considering the 
normativity of each of these epistemic properties would obviously take us too far 
afield. The best way of proceeding is thus to discuss only the less contentious instances 
of epistemic normative properties even though, as just said, none of them is completely 
uncontroversial.9 Also, the reader is free to modify the spectrum of our analyses by 
restricting the field of epistemic normative properties as she thinks appropriate. Our 
analyses do not have the ambition of providing uncontroversial definitions of the vari-
ous epistemic normative properties. They simply illustrate how such properties can be 
analyzed in a buck-passing framework.
3.1. Thin epistemic properties
What would buck-passing analyses of thin epistemic properties look like? According 
to the usual characterization presented in Section 2, a thin property is characterized by 
its carrying minimal or no descriptive or informative content about the thing assessed 
and by its constituting the most generic type of evaluation within the relevant normative 
8 We recognize that this list is not exhaustive. We did not, for example, consider buck-passing analyses 
of intrinsic values, agent-neutral and agent-relative values, betterness, duty, and virtue.
9 For instance, we will not consider certain epistemic properties which are commonly considered to 
belong to the epistemic domain but whose normative status is contentious. These include, for example, the 
properties of being reliable, coherent, and a priori. Skorupski (2010, ch. 2) has attempted a buck-passing 
analysis of some these notions.
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domain. Accordingly, buck-passing analyses of thin properties (1) do not entail a 
specification of the descriptive properties that constitute reasons for the relevant 
attitudes and (2) appeal to the most generic type of pro- or con-attitudes characteriz-
ing the relevant normative domain. Let us illustrate these two points by contrasting the 
buck-passing analyses of thin versus thick normative properties in other normative 
domains. Consider, first, the moral domain. We assume, for the sake of argument, that 
the most generic attitude in the moral realm is blame.10 Possible analyses of the thin 
property of moral badness and the thick property of despicability are as follows.11
Moral badness
For an act A to be morally bad is for A to have certain properties that constitute 
reasons to blame someone who As.
Despicability
For an act A to be despicable is for A to have certain properties that constitute 
reasons to despise someone who As.
Observe that despising is a specific way of blaming someone.12 In buck-passing 
 analyses, this relation of genericity-specificity between fitting attitudes explains why, 
e.g. being despicable is a specific way of being morally bad, that is, why despicability is 
a thicker property than moral badness. Consider a similar example in the aesthetic 
domain. Take admiration as the most generic aesthetic pro-attitude, and revulsion 
(intended in an aesthetic sense of the term) as its correlated con-attitude. Now, con-
sider the properties of being aesthetically disvaluable and disgusting.
Aesthetically disvaluable
For an object X to be aesthetically disvaluable is for X to have certain properties that 
constitute reasons to feel revulsion about X.
Disgusting
For an object X to be disgusting is for X to have certain properties that constitute 
reasons to be disgusted by X.
Feeling disgusted by something is a specific way of feeling revulsion about that thing and, 
accordingly, the property of being disgusting is a thicker, more specific aesthetic property, 
while the property of being aesthetically disvaluable is a thinner, more generic one.
This illustrates a peculiar feature of buck-passing analyses of thin properties in dif-
ferent normative domains: the characterization of the thinnest property in a domain is 
put in terms of the most generic pro- or con-attitude characterizing this domain.
10 Skorupski (2010, §1.8 and ch. 10).
11 Again, the details of the analyses do not matter. The reader can, for example, substitute blameworthi-
ness with shamefulness, and/or consider a different thick property if she thinks despicability is not a thick 
property.
12 The reader might object that despising is not a way of blaming. If so, she should feel free to replace 
“blame” with the name of a more generic con-attitude that is, according to her, such that despising is a spe-
cies of it.
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In order to provide buck-passing analyses of the thinnest epistemic  properties, it is 
thus necessary to individuate the most generic pro- and con-attitude characterizing 
the epistemic domain. Many epistemologists would agree that the relevant pro-attitude 
is the attitude of believing and the relevant con-attitude the attitude of disbelieving. 
Some would also take withholding judgment to be such a generic irreducible doxastic 
attitude.13 Furthermore, even if there is wide disagreement on whether all reasons for 
believing and disbelieving are epistemic,14 there is no substantive disagreement about 
the claim that epistemic reasons are paradigmatically reasons for doxastic attitudes,15 
namely, belief, disbelief, withholding—and closely related responses such as judging, 
inferring, and concluding.16 Consequently, buck-passing analyses of the thinnest 
epistemic normative properties are analyses that define epistemic normative proper-
ties in terms of reasons for doxastic attitudes.
Epistemic goodness (E-good)
For X to be E-good is for X to have certain properties that constitute reasons to 
believe X.
Epistemic badness (E-bad)
For X to be E-bad is for X to have certain properties that constitute reasons to disbe-
lieve X.
Epistemic neutrality (E-neutral)
For X to be E-neutral is for X to have certain properties that constitute reasons to 
withhold judgment about whether X.
In what follows, for reasons of brevity, we focus our attention on the analysis of epistemic 
goodness. But analogous considerations apply to epistemic badness and to epistemic neu-
trality (assuming that withholding is a fundamental doxastic attitude, one that is not 
reducible to more basic doxastic attitudes such as the absence of both belief and 
disbelief).
A legitimate worry concerns whether it is appropriate to consider belief a pro-attitude. 
“Pro-attitude” is a term of art typically used to refer to motivational states—such as valu-
ing or favoring—that have the world-to-mind direction of fit and do not play, thereby, 
the same role as beliefs in our mental economy. In accounts of values, buck-passers 
13 There is disagreement on whether we should extend the title of fundamental epistemic reasons to 
reasons to withhold judgment. For a positive answer see, for example, Schroeder 2012.
14 For an overview, see Reisner, forthcoming.
15 Here doxastic attitudes are conceived as to include both full attitudes and partial ones. When we talk 
of reasons for doxastic attitudes we thus include not only, e.g. reasons for outright belief, but also reasons 
to be more or less confident in a certain proposition.
16 Note that Skorupski (2010, 35) takes reasons to “think, judge, conclude, and so on” to be epistemic 
reasons as well. However, the wide majority of epistemologists and ethicists of all stripes take epistemic 
reasons to be reasons for doxastic attitudes only. For instance, Sylvan (2016), in his introductory survey on 
epistemic reasons, claims that epistemic reasons are a subset of the normative reasons for doxastic atti-
tudes. Similar claims are common in the literature on epistemic reasons. See e.g. Schroeder forthcoming; 
Turri 2009.
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typically appeal to valuing responses, but believing and disbelieving are not traditionally 
considered kinds of valuing and disvaluing.17 It may, therefore, be argued that an 
appeal to a different kind of response such as belief doesn’t count as an account of value 
at all, and that it is not promising to generalize a BPA to epistemic value in this way.
Our aim in this chapter is however to provide a BPA of epistemic normativity. Now, 
in epistemology and practical philosophy, there is a nearly universal agreement that 
epistemic normativity is exclusively concerned with reasons for doxastic attitudes 
(together, maybe, with a few other closely related responses such as judgment). There 
is quite a wide consensus that epistemic normativity should be distinguished from 
other types of normativity precisely on the basis of the specific set of attitudes it provides 
reasons for.18 In this standard picture, appealing to reasons for non-doxastic attitudes 
such as valuing responses (e.g. praise, admiration) amounts to ruling out the possibil-
ity that the resulting account captures a genuinely epistemic type of value. In other 
words, if it is true—as the worry goes—that beliefs (and a few closely related attitudes) 
cannot occupy the place of a response in a BPA of values, this simply means that there 
are no distinctively epistemic values.19 If there is something like genuine epistemic 
value, belief (or some related response such as judgment) should be the corresponding 
attitude in terms of which this value is analyzed. Let us, furthermore, emphasize that 
our aim in this chapter is merely hypothetical. We do not aim at demonstrating that 
a BPA of epistemic value is indeed possible. We only intend to show what it would 
look like if it were such. In what follows, for the sake of argument, we assume there is a 
genuinely epistemic kind of value that is analyzable in terms of reasons for doxastic 
attitudes (and a few closely related attitudes).
In BPAs of values in general, the object of evaluation is the same as the intentional 
object of the relevant pro-attitude. This is also the case in the analysis of epistemic 
goodness. X is the intentional object of the attitude of believing, that is, the believed 
proposition. In a buck-passing framework, the objects of thin epistemic evaluation are 
not doxastic attitudes, but propositions. This would certainly be a serious limitation of 
the BPA of epistemic normativity. Both in epistemology and ordinary language the 
17 Though some philosophers have argued that belief is a distinctive type of positive feeling or emotive 
response toward a proposition. This idea traces back at least to David Hume and counts important 
upholders such as William James and Bertrand Russell.
18 See fn. 16 for references. Some philosophers define epistemic reasons as facts that are evidence of the 
truth of a proposition, or that make a proposition likely to be true (e.g. Parfit 2011, 47). This definition is 
compatible with there being epistemic reasons for non-doxastic attitudes such as judging, concluding, and 
maybe even guessing. However, also according to this definition, epistemic reasons are not reasons for 
responses having a world-to-mind direction of fit. That certain facts raise the probability of proposition p 
can make these facts reasons to believe, judge, or guess that p, but it rarely makes them reasons to e.g. praise 
or admire that p.
19 Of course, nothing prevents us calling “epistemic” certain values that are reducible to reasons for a 
different set of responses—e.g. some type of valuing attitude such as praise or admiration for certain epi-
stemic conditions. We have nothing against this alternative terminological choice. However, this alterna-
tive use captures a kind of normativity which is not the one at work when epistemologists talk of epistemic 
normativity and which is also not the one constituting the focus of our chapter.
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standard objects of epistemic assessments have been universally considered to be 
doxastic attitudes, not propositions.20 We rarely assess a proposition according to 
whether it is epistemically valuable.
One may think that extending assessments from propositions to doxastic attitudes 
can dodge this odd consequence. Unfortunately things are not so simple. As we men-
tioned in Section 2, many buck-passers consider it to be a constraint of their analyses 
of value that the valuable object be the intentional object of a fitting attitude. If our 
object of assessment is not the proposition p, but a doxastic attitude, say the belief that p, 
then an appropriate buck-passing analysis of its value should find some attitude that 
fits that object. But we also said that the most generic type of attitude characterizing the 
epistemic domain is the attitude of believing itself. This leads us to the conclusion that, 
if S’s belief that p is epistemically valuable, its being epistemically valuable must reduce 
to reasons to believe the specific proposition that [S believes that p]. The result is that 
our doxastic attitudes can be the object of epistemic valuation only qua contents of 
propositions, and their value would be reducible to reasons for second-order beliefs.
A possible solution to this difficulty that the buck-passing analysis of epistemic 
goodness seems to raise would be to deny the aforementioned constraint on the inten-
tional object. However, this implies a significant departure from previous fitting attitude 
accounts of value. A more promising approach consists in complementing the buck-
passing analysis of values with a buck-passing analysis of deontic properties—such as 
rightness. While the BPA of value accounts for epistemic assessments of propositions, 
the deontic analysis bears on doxastic attitudes.
As we previously emphasized, deontic properties do not seem to be subject to the 
constraint that the object of assessment must also be the object of the fitting attitude 
(see Section 2). Recall the standard analysis of rightness:
Rightness
A certain type of act F is right iff there are some facts p which are jointly sufficient 
reasons to F.
We can see how, in this analysis, the action assessed as right is also the one there are 
sufficient reasons to perform. If, in this formula, we substitute the type of act with the 
attitude of believing, we have an intuitive buck-passing analysis of what we might call, 
for now, “epistemic rightness”:
Epistemic rightness (E-right)
A belief that p is E-right iff there are some facts q which are jointly sufficient reasons 
to believe that p.21
20 Other usual objects of epistemic assessments are agents and/or their character traits. We discuss traits 
in Section 3.5.
21 Epistemic wrongness can be accordingly defined in terms of lack of sufficient reasons to believe; or 
alternatively in terms of decisive reasons not to believe (which is formally equivalent). For reasons of space, 
we will not be able to discuss negative normative properties here.
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It seems thus that the thinnest epistemic properties of doxastic attitudes call for a buck-
passing analysis of deontic, rather than evaluative, properties. Under the hypothesis 
that the buck-passing analysis should be able to capture the thinnest epistemic norma-
tive properties of doxastic attitudes, such a thinnest epistemic normative property 
would be a deontic property. This is a first very interesting result.
Now suppose that the thinnest epistemic property for doxastic attitudes is justifica-
tion—as we try to argue immediately below. Under the hypothesis that the buck-passing 
analysis should be able to capture the thinnest epistemic normative properties of dox-
astic attitudes, justification is a deontic property. In contrast, many epistemologists, 
such as reliabilists and epistemic consequentialists, have argued that justification 
(as well as other normative properties attributed to doxastic attitudes) is an evaluative, 
and not a deontic, property. The conclusion we reach conditionally supports a deontic 
conception of justification.22
This support is conditional since it depends on the validity of the buck-passing 
analysis in the epistemic realm and on the truth of the aforementioned constraint on 
the intentional object. Note that none of what we say below rests on the assumption 
that the thinnest epistemic property attributed to doxastic attitudes is a deontic property.
We have so far considered how thin epistemic properties are analyzed within a 
buck-passing framework. We haven’t yet said much about what these epistemic prop-
erties are. In this respect, “epistemic goodness” and “epistemic rightness” are just artificial 
labels for thin epistemic normative properties that are either evaluative or deontic. Let 
us now consider whether there are ordinary or technical properties that can replace 
the labels E-good and E-right in the above analyses. An answer to this question will tell 
us which “standard” epistemic properties are to be considered thin (if any).
First consider E-goodness. Which evaluative property is it possible to attribute to 
propositions and is also analyzable along the lines presented above? As mentioned 
before, some philosophers have argued that truth is an evaluative property of proposi-
tions. Can truth be the property we are searching for? This suggestion is problematic 
for at least two reasons. First, there are propositions that are true even though there is 
no reason to believe them.23 Consider, for example, truths such as that the exact num-
ber of cats in Vicenza on Christmas Eve of 1698 was n. That there are no clues (even 
misleading) of what this number is seems to exclude that there are reasons for anyone 
to believe it. Another problem is that if we define truth as E-goodness, it seems equally 
natural to define falsity as E-badness. However, if we accept the law of excluded middle 
for at least some set of propositions P, we end up with the conclusion that there is never 
22 Because the key deontic notion in our analysis is rightness and not a strong form of permission or 
obligatoriness, the deontic conception of justification that we advocate does not necessarily have the kind 
of voluntarist or responsibilist implications that some philosophers have attributed to it (e.g. Alston 1988).
23 See, for example, Skorupski 2010, 43. It is worth observing that some philosophers disagree with this 
claim. For example, Schroeder 2012 holds that there are always (objective) reasons to believe any truth, no 
matter whether accessible or not.
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reason to suspend judgment about any proposition in this set.24 If we want to preserve 
the possibility of having reasons neither to believe p, nor to believe not-p, we must 
identify the pair E-goodness/E-badness with some properties other than truth/falsity.
Which other property can do the work here? It is not obvious how to answer this 
question. Part of the difficulty comes from the fact that philosophers have very differ-
ent views about (1) which type of things can count as a reason to believe (known 
facts, facts one is in a position to know, propositions one rationally believes . . . ) and 
(2) which kind of features can ground the epistemic reason relation (probabilistic, 
counterfactual or causal support, fallible versus infallible support, and so on). Different 
views on these matters go with very different extensions of what is E-good. For example, 
if one assumes that reasons are rationally believed propositions (no matter whether 
true or false) and a probabilistic support relation, every proposition made probable 
by one’s rational beliefs will count as E-good, including false propositions and merely 
statistically supported propositions (e.g. that my ticket in a fair 1000-ticket lottery is a 
loser). One will reach very different results if one assumes, for example, that reasons 
are facts that one is in a position to know and an infallible support relation. In this case, 
E-good  propositions will be a subset of all truths. To be sure, this lack of specification 
in the buck-passing analysis is not problematic. The fact that the BPA can remain neu-
tral on such substantive issues—while providing a framework in which they can be 
understood and, potentially, resolved—can even be considered a virtue.
Let us now consider E-rightness. Which kind of property is it possible to attribute to 
beliefs and is also analyzable in terms of there being sufficient reasons to hold these 
beliefs? Or, more simply, how do we ordinarily classify beliefs supported by sufficient 
reasons? Here the answer seems easier. The large majority of epistemologists would 
attribute to these beliefs the status of being justified.25 Again, depending on how one 
conceives of the entities that count as reasons to believe and the epistemic support 
relation, one will reach radically different views about the extension of E-rightness. Not 
surprisingly, these different views reflect various conceptions of justification.
A buck-passing analysis of thin epistemic properties also sheds new light on the 
related debate regarding the norms of belief. Philosophers have argued for very different 
competing norms of belief. Here is a short list:
(TN) For any S and p: S may believe p only if it is true that p.
(KN) For any S and p: S may believe p only if S knows that p.
(EN) For any S and p: S may believe p only if p is supported by S’s evidence.
24 For a similar point (though directed to the notions of correctness and permissibility), see Reisner forth-
coming, §1.
25 We observe here that the identification of E-rightness and justification fits nicely with typical theories 
of justification in terms of sufficient reasons to believe. This identification also supports the idea that justi-
fication is a deontic property, since the properties typical of deontic buck-passing analyses (considered in 
Section 2) would be clearly identifiable in these accounts.
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A buck-passing analysis of normative uses of “may” could be the following:26
May
S may F iff there are some facts p which are sufficient reasons to F.
The reader can observe that this analysis is identical to that of rightness considered 
above. Thus, what is right for a person to do is also what she may do. Assuming that this 
analysis is correct, we can reformulate the various norms of belief as follows:
(R-TN) For any S and p: there are sufficient reasons for S to believe p only if it is 
true that p.
(R-KN) For any S and p: there are sufficient reasons for S to believe p only if S 
knows that p.
(R-EN) For any S and p: there are sufficient reasons for S to believe p only if p is 
supported by S’s evidence.
(R-TN), (R-KN), and (R-EN) would be reducible, respectively, to the claims that there 
are never sufficient reasons (or there are decisive reasons not) to believe what is false, 
what is not known, and what is not supported by evidence. Again, we can easily observe 
that depending on how we conceive of reasons to believe and the support relation, 
some of these norms will look more or less intuitive or problematic. For example, 
consider a fallibilist conception according to which, even if all the reasons for a certain 
subject point toward believing p, the supported proposition can still be false. This 
view seems incompatible with factive norms (e.g. truth and knowledge norms). This 
is because, according to this view, some proposition can be false or unknown, and 
nevertheless the subject can have sufficient, or even decisive, reasons to believe p. It 
seems then that a factive conception of epistemic norms forces a move toward more 
infallibilist conceptions of rational support relations, while vice versa non-factive 
norms (e.g. an evidence norm) are compatible with fallible rational support relations.
This discussion is very rough and sketchy, but it gives a hint of how a buck-passing 
analysis of epistemic normativity can cast new light on the problem of the norm of 
belief and, possibly, indicates solutions to this problem, or at least incompatibilities 
between certain clusters of views.
3.2. Thick properties
In this section we consider buck-passing analyses of epistemic thick normative prop-
erties. We characterized thick normative properties, in general, as those analyzable in 
terms of distinct and specific kinds of appropriate responses. As we also said, these 
specific responses stand in a relation of specificity-genericity to more generic attitudes 
characterizing the relevant normative domain. In the epistemic domain, the most 
generic pro- and con-attitudes are those of believing and disbelieving, and perhaps 
26 See Skorupski 2007, §5 and fn. 7 above.
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withholding (or suspending) judgment. In order to see how buck-passing analyses of 
epistemic thick normative properties would look, we need, first, to consider which 
more specific attitudes stand in a specificity-genericity relation to these attitudes. Once 
these more specific doxastic attitudes have been individuated, we will be in a position 
to say which epistemic properties are such that having them amounts to having prop-
erties that constitute reasons to hold these specific doxastic attitudes. In other words, 
we will be able to identify which epistemic properties are thick epistemic properties in 
a buck-passing framework.
Are there specific ways of believing, disbelieving, and withholding judgment? We 
think there are. To start with, consider the attitude of believing. Being certain that p is a 
specific way of believing that p (namely, believing that p with a very high confidence). 
Other similar attitudes are being sure and being convinced that p (viz. believing with a 
rather high degree of confidence). A recent debate in epistemology and philosophy of 
mind concerns whether belief entails complete confidence in the believed proposition 
or is compatible with having relatively little confidence in what we believe.27 We do not 
want to take a stance in this debate. We just note that if one endorses the weaker con-
ception of belief (or alternatively a wide conception encompassing both weak and 
strong uses of the notion), one can classify as specific ways of believing propositional 
attitudes such as conjecturing, suspecting, being convinced, being confident, and 
thinking that p. They are all specific ways of believing that p with a (more or less) weak 
degree of confidence.
For what concerns specific ways of disbelieving, we can mention attitudes such as 
doubting, mistrusting, and excluding that p. Finally, some attitudes seem to be specific 
ways of withholding judgment. These include, for example, being uncertain that p, 
hesitating about whether p, being undecided about whether p.
Now that we have identified more specific doxastic attitudes, we are in a position to 
say which epistemic properties are, in a buck-passing framework, thick epistemic 
properties. Here are plausible analyses of some thick epistemic properties attributable 
to propositions:
E-certainty
For X to be certain is for X to have certain properties that constitute reasons to be 
certain that X.
E-probability/likelihood
For X to be probable/likely is for X to have certain properties that constitute reasons 
to be confident/conjecture/suspect/think that X.28
27 Hawthorne et al. 2016, for instance, argue that our everyday notion of belief is unambiguously such a 
weak one.
28 This analysis applies to epistemic probability. Other notions of probability (e.g. frequentist, modal) 
are not analyzable in these terms. The same remark is mutatis mutandis true of likelihood/unlikelihood 
and possibility/impossibility (mentioned below). They have to be taken in their epistemic sense. Note also 
that the choice of one or the other of the various attitudes mentioned in the analysans depends on how 
likely it is that X.
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E-improbability/unlikelihood
For X to be improbable/unlikely is for X to have certain properties that constitute 
reasons to doubt/mistrust that X.
E-impossibility
For X to be (epistemically) impossible is for X to have certain properties that consti-
tute reasons to exclude that X.
Unclarity
For X to be unclear is for X to have certain properties that constitute reasons to be 
undecided about whether X.
Let us stress once again that these analyses do not have the ambition of providing 
uncontroversial definitions of the various thick epistemic properties. It simply 
illustrates how thick epistemic properties can be analyzed in a buck-passing frame-
work. As the reader will have noticed, some of the analyzed properties are ways of 
being E-good (e.g. being certain); others are ways of being E-bad (e.g. unlikely) or of being 
E-neutral (e.g. being unclear).
It is often argued that the distinction between thin and thick properties applies only 
to evaluative properties, not to deontic properties.29 If this is right, there are no thick 
properties that constitute ways of being E-right and E-wrong, that is, ways of being jus-
tified and unjustified. It seems, however, possible to capture the E-rightness or justification 
of specific doxastic attitudes (being certain, being confident, doubting, excluding, and 
so on) in terms of there being some facts which are sufficient reasons for having these 
attitudes (toward particular propositions) and the E-wrongness or lack of justification 
of these specific doxastic attitudes in terms of the lack of sufficient reasons for having 
these attitudes. Thus, sometimes we will not merely be justified in believing a certain 
proposition p, but also justified in being certain or persuaded that p; or we may not 
merely be justified in disbelieving that p, but also justified in doubting or excluding 
that p; or not merely justified in withholding judgment about whether p, but also justi-
fied in being uncertain or undecided about whether p.
3.3. Mixed properties
Let us now consider buck-passing analyses of mixed epistemic properties. In Section 2 
we characterized mixed normative properties, such as cruelty, as those normative 
properties that can be analyzed in terms of specific types of non-normative properties 
that constitute reasons for the relevant attitude. Are there mixed epistemic properties? 
We think there are. Unfortunately, here we cannot adopt the “backward” method used 
for providing buck-passing analyses of thin and thick epistemic properties. This is 
because the types of fitting attitudes involved in the analyses of mixed properties are 
the same as those used in the analyses of thin properties. Indeed, the peculiarity of 
these properties does not lie in the type of fitting attitude, but rather in the specific 
29 Mulligan 1998, 2009; Ogien and Tappolet 2009.
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types of considerations that count as reasons for the attitude. The mixed epistemic 
properties of some X are thus to be analyzed in terms of (i) there being reasons to 
have the relevant attitudes—belief, disbelief, or withholding—which are constituted by 
certain properties of X where (ii) these properties belong to some specific type. Here 
are buck-passing analyses of some mixed epistemic properties:
Straightforward
For X to be straightforward is (i) for X to have certain properties that constitute 
reasons to believe that X and (ii) these properties make X uncomplicated, easy to 
understand.
Indisputable
For X to be indisputable is (i) for X to have certain properties that constitute reasons 
to believe that X and (ii) these properties make X not open to question or dispute.
Other properties, which could receive similar analyses, are, for example, being obvious, 
unambiguous, irrefutable, unmistakable, distinct, confirmed, and so on.
Similar accounts can be given for opposite properties such as being unobvious, dis-
putable, unconfirmed, indistinct, etc. In these cases, the reasons will be reasons to 
withhold judgment or to form a low degree of confidence in the assessed proposition. 
Other mixed epistemic properties analyzable in terms of the attitude of withholding 
are, for example, being vague, obscure, and indeterminate.
Vague
For X to be vague is (i) for X to have certain properties that provide reasons to with-
hold judgment about whether X and (ii) these properties make X indiscriminable, 
unfocused, indefinite, etc.
Obscure
For X to be obscure is (i) for X to have certain properties that provide reasons to 
withhold judgment about whether X and (ii) these properties have to do with a lack 
of information about whether X.
Again, these various analyses serve a merely illustrative purpose and are not sup-
posed to be completely accurate. Some of the properties that we classify as mixed 
epistemic properties might also be considered to be thick properties.30 The property 
of being obscure, for instance, can be analyzed in terms of reasons to withhold 
judgment about whether X based on a lack of information (mixed interpretation), 
or in terms of reasons to be confused and undecided about whether X (thick inter-
pretation). There are similar debates concerning non-epistemic normative proper-
ties. The sole goal of the present analysis is to illustrate how an analysis of mixed 
epistemic properties could proceed and what the end result would look like. We are 
open to revising details.
30 Or to be not normative at all.
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3.4. Complex entities and properties
Complex entities and properties, such as murder, are partly constituted by normative 
properties and partly by non-normative ones. Complex epistemic entities and properties 
are those that involve in their analysis a non-normative component and an epistemic-
ally normative component.
A traditional view in epistemology holds that a proper analysis of knowledge 
requires, amongst other things, the recognition that there are sufficient reasons to 
believe the known proposition.31 If this is the case, then knowledge is a complex epi-
stemic entity. It is—like murder—factorizable into a non-normative component—which 
may involve all sorts of non-normative conditions: factual, modal, causal, explanatory, 
reliability-related, internal—and a normative component ultimately reducible to there 
being sufficient reasons to believe the known proposition. Of course, many have also 
argued that knowledge is an unanalyzable, primitive notion.32 We are also conscious 
that the issue whether knowledge is normative is widely debated in the literature. For 
instance, some philosophers have suggested that it is a natural kind.33 This is not the 
place to settle this very complex and wide-ranging dispute. We would simply like to 
observe that, if it is appropriate to provide a buck-passing analysis of complex epi-
stemic entities such as knowledge, then the dispute can partially be adjudicated by 
considering whether knowledge of p is metaphysically compatible with the absence of 
sufficient reasons to believe p.
Other candidates to the title of complex epistemic entities might be clues, indices, 
and indications. They seem all to be partially definable in terms of their making pro-
positions more likely for a subject. If, as suggested in Section 3.2, epistemic probability 
and likelihood are normative, then these entities have a normative component.
3.5. The epistemic value of cognitive states
The following are often recognized to be epistemically valuable cognitive states: know-
ledge, true belief, justified belied, and understanding.34 For instance, the view that 
knowledge is valuable is taken for granted by the numerous philosophers who have 
tried to solve the Meno problem, that is, the issue of what makes knowledge a better 
epistemic standing than mere true belief.35 The reader might have noticed that the lat-
ter states, even though they are usually considered to carry some “epistemic value,” do 
not appear in our previous analyses.36 How would a BPA capture the epistemic value 
that knowledge, true belief, justified belief, and understanding are supposed to possess?
31 See e.g. Ayer 1956; Chisholm 1957; Conee and Feldman 2004; Russell 1948.
32 E.g. Hossack 2007; Williamson 2000.
33 E.g. Kornblith 1993; Millikan 1984.
34 See e.g. Ahlstrom-Vij 2013 and David 2005 for the view that true belief is the fundamental epistemic 
good; DePaul 2001 for the view that justified belief is of fundamental epistemic value; and Kvanvig 2003 for 
the claim that understanding is an epistemically fundamental good.
35 See Pritchard 2007 for an overview.
36 We have suggested a buck-passing analysis of knowledge, but this is very different from giving an 
analysis of the epistemic value of knowledge.
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As the reader can readily observe, there is no easy way of accounting for the value of 
these cognitive states in terms of epistemic reasons. When we say that knowledge has 
more epistemic value than Gettierized true belief, we are not saying that there are more 
reasons to believe knowledge than Gettierized true belief. Assuming that the latter 
claim makes any sense at all, this is clearly not what we mean with such comparative 
assessments. We are rather saying that there are reasons to favor, promote, like, or pre-
fer knowledge to Gettierized true belief. The pro-attitude in terms of which the value of 
knowledge, true belief, justified belief, and understanding needs to be analyzed is not 
the attitude of believing but the attitude of favoring (or desiring, liking, etc.). Now, 
favoring, desiring, and liking are not pro-attitudes that characterize the epistemic 
domain of evaluation. Rather, they appear in buck-passing analyses of practical values 
(see Section 2). Even though they are most often called “epistemic values,” the value of 
the cognitive states just mentioned apparently has more to do with the practical realm 
of evaluation than with the epistemic realm. This is not an anodyne result since this 
would make, say, knowledge a practical good, one that is directly commensurable with 
other practical goods (e.g. pleasure, utility, etc.).
One way of avoiding this conclusion is to connect the reasons we have to favor 
these cognitive states to genuine epistemic properties—in particular E-goodness and 
E-rightness—in such a way that the reasons in question will derive some form of epi-
stemic normativity from their relation to them. A relation that allows this form of 
derivation is the relation that connects instrumental values to the final value they pro-
mote.37 Suppose, for instance, that the value of beauty is instrumental, that beautiful 
things are valuable in virtue of the finally valuable pleasant mental states they trigger. 
The value of beauty would, therefore, be hedonistic. Is it possible to provide buck-
passing analyses of the value of these cognitive states in which the latter would qualify 
as an epistemic instrumental value, viz. a value that derives its normative force from 
the proper epistemic good or right it might bring about? This is possible.
It suffices to make clear that we have reason to favor these states for the sake of the 
E-rightness or the E-goodness that such states might bring about. That is, for a state S 
(knowledge, true belief, justified belief, understanding) to be valuable is for it to be instru-
mentally epistemically valuable (IE valuable) where IE value is, in a buck-passing 
framework, analyzed as follows.
Instrumental-epistemic value (IE-value)
For a state S to be IE-valuable is for S to have properties that constitute reasons to 
favor S because being in S tends either to bring about more and better potential 
reasons to believe and beliefs supported by epistemic reasons or to prevent beliefs 
not supported by epistemic reasons.38
37 See e.g. Chang 2015.
38 We recognize that this analysis is sketchy and doesn’t address a series of issues such as how exactly a 
cognitive state tends to bring about reasons to believe. Furthermore, even though we have formulated the 
account in instrumental terms, we want to remain open on whether the derivative value should be acquired 
instrumentally or in some other derivative way. See Sylvan (2018) for an alternative proposal.
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By instrumentally relating the value of knowledge, true belief, justified belief, and 
understanding to reasons to believe, this analysis has the advantage of avoiding the 
aforementioned worrying conclusion. It preserves the epistemic flavor of the assess-
ment and the incommensurability with practical values. Furthermore, this analysis 
casts new light on the debate pertaining to the value of cognitive states. This is because 
different accounts of epistemic reasons and reasons relations give rise, as we said, to 
different forms of E-goodness, to distinct final values, thereby affecting the question of 
which states are more instrumentally conducive to these final values.
We conclude this section by mentioning that a similar account is available for a set of 
epistemic virtues—those usually labeled “responsibilist”—such as open-mindedness, 
carefulness, and intellectual courage (as well as for the corresponding vices).39 As for 
the value of cognitive states, these virtues cannot be analyzed directly in terms of 
reasons to believe. One can be open-minded or careful without there being any reason 
to believe anything. However, these virtues can be analyzed in terms of instrumental 
reasons, as good means to bring about beliefs supported by reasons and to prevent 
beliefs not supported by reasons:
E-virtuosity
For a trait of character C to be E-virtuous is for C to have properties that constitute 
reasons to favor it because possessing C tends either to bring about better potential 
reasons to believe and beliefs supported by epistemic reasons or to prevent beliefs 
not supported by epistemic reasons.
4. Conclusion
While BPAs are widely discussed in the literature, there has not yet been a serious 
attempt to apply buck-passing analysis to epistemic normativity. In this chapter, we 
have tried to fill this gap. We provided buck-passing analyses of various epistemic nor-
mative properties. Our analyses cover all types of normative properties that other 
buck-passing analyses in other domains cover: thin, thick, and mixed normative prop-
erties, complex normative properties and entities, and derivative normative assessments. 
While these analyses have no pretense to being perfect, fully accurate, or complete, 
they can pave the way for future work going in the same direction.
In addition, we think that our analyses unveil several interesting and important 
aspects of epistemic normativity by providing a systematic account of how various 
epistemic properties relate. Further, these analyses have occasionally proved useful in 
providing a new perspective on and fresh approach to traditional epistemological 
problems. For example, they indicate that epistemic assessments of doxastic attitudes 
such as justification are better classified as deontic properties than evaluative ones. 
They highlight the relevance of issues concerning the ontology of epistemic reasons 
39 See Baehr 2004, §3 for an overview.
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and the nature of the basing relation for a wide variety of debates including those on 
the nature of epistemic justification, on the fundamental norm of belief, and on the 
epistemic value of mental states. Finally, they provide a wide and structured normative 
framework within which the most diverse epistemic properties (including clarity, like-
lihood, vagueness, knowledge, and the value of understanding) can find their place.40
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